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A Response to Harel, Hope,
and Schwartz
John Finnis*
It is a privilege to have this opportunity of responding to the thoughtful objec-
tions made by Alon Harel, Simon Hope, and Daniel Schwartz to theses I
advance in my Collected Essays, Volume III, Human Rights and Common Good.
I take up first the more or less political-institutional issues, and then the under-
lying issues concerning the pre-political content of a community's common
good, and the basic elements in the flourishing and rights of its members as
human persons facing the choices needed for worthwhile, just, and sustainable
communities.
All these issues, institutional or not, are thoroughly normative. And so they
involve a lot of non-normative facts and predictions-not because you can get
an Ought from a sheer Is (or from a Was or a Will be), but because all practical
reasoning has not only at least one normative premise but also at least one
factual premise about circumstances and predictable causalities.
So, Section I considers Harel's thesis that judicial review can be defended
because my "inauthenticity" critique of it applies a fortiori to the legislative
articulation of human rights. Section II considers Harel's thesis that my
account of punishment is a "consequentialism" of "harmony". Section III
considers Schwartz's thesis that the principle of subsidiarity is an insufficient
restraint on governmental action. Section IV considers Harel's and incidentally
Hope's theses on sex ethics (particularly their thesis that same-sex relations
and marriage are morally acceptable), an ethics of basic and great import-
ance for socio-political life and theory, though conspicuously neglected in
late-liberal political theory (unlike early liberal, say Thomist theory). Section
V, finally, considers Hope's thesis that our understanding of basic human goods
cannot be disentangled from the local morality or moralities in which we grew
up-or at least, cannot be disentangled sufficiently to provide us with moral
guidance.
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I
Harel's attempt to turn against legislatures the inauthenticity argument I dir-
ected against courts seems to me to lack traction. By amendments to my
"special insult" paragraph, he envisages legislators or a legislature acting
precisely "in the name of rights," and claims that in so doing they give the
appearance' of acting not to protect rights but instead to "exercise their dis-
cretion, represent their constituencies," etc.2 Is this scenario coherent? When a
legislature purports to be protecting rights (as legislatures often do), it so far
forth denies that it is acting out of "good will" in its "discretion," or to advance
voters' views rather than the legislators' best judgment about what the relevant
rights require.
If one thus, like Harel, speaks of legislatures and their powers in standard
hard-nosed "political science," external-observer terms-as exercising discre-
tion, obeying the raw views of the voters, their whims, and so forth-and, on
the other hand, speaks of courts in idealized, internal, self-interpretation
terms-as enforcing duties that exist independently of their will, by judgments
that are binding in virtue of their content, and so forth, one's purported com-
parisons are, I think, misleading and of no value as comparisons. There is,
of course, room for a hard-nosed, external account of judicial decisions as
exercises of the power of majorities among judges all appointed by the execu-
tive governments in power at the time of their respective appointments, and all
maneuvering for support of favored outcomes in cases perhaps quite removed
from the case at hand. There is room, too, for an account of legislation in the
terms such as constitutions employ when they confer power on legislatures to
make laws "for peace, order and good government" or "for the... public
welfare." After all, sensible citizens hold that the legislature and its members
owe their authority to the Constitution, written or unwritten, and (regardless
of the presence or absence of judicial review) have a constitutional duty to
uphold the historic rights of the people they represent-and act authentically
when they try to do so. Sensible citizens also hold that the legislature should
be dissolved and its members replaced when they defy or fail to respect those
rights, or when they interpret or deal with them in ways that injure the
common good of that people. That position is compatible with the accompany-
ing thought that until a statute has been repealed or a constitutional provision
amended, it presumptively imposes moral-political obligations of compliance
that are defeasible only by either strong injustice or competing moral
Not "potential appearance": in any given case there is either appearance or no appearance.
2 I fail to see why to "make decisions in light of their convictions in the name of the polity" even appears to
be inconsistent with acting for the sake of human or other rights; some convictions are convictions precisely
about what rights people have, whether as human persons or as citizens of a polity with a proud tradition of
protecting rights.
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responsibilities of particular persons or classes of persons. Be all that as it may,
the mode and type of account must be the same on both sides of the
comparison.3
The "inauthenticity" objection to wide powers of judicial review on "Bill of
Rights" grounds is an internal critique, independent of any "hard-nosed" ac-
count of judicial decisions such as was sketched in the preceding paragraph.
Recall the passage quoted by Harel in setting up his argument about the in-
authenticity of legislation about rights: "Here, perhaps, is the special insult
added to the injury done when courts, in the name of rights, have overturned
statutes and thereby sustained, abetted, or even imposed child labour..." and
so forth. "Here" where? The preceding sentence reads (I add a few bracketed
clarifications):
... when a judge has to determine, not what rights and principles have been estab-
lished by the existing law as a whole, but whether existing laws measure up to the
'inspirational' terms of a novel constitutional instrument, may not his judgment, too
[that is, like a legislator's], be deflected-say, [in the case of judges] by a narrow
concern for precedent, the formulae of the text, the bounds of the pleadings and
arguments addressed to it, and the parties' special circumstances, and by the political
vices (more discreetly indulged [than is typical of legislators]), and mistaken political
theories (such as utilitarianism, neutral liberalism, or social-cohesion conservatism),
which enjoy a wider success amongst the sophisticated?
And the sentence following the passage quoted by Harel is:
Only out of court will the judge say what Mr Justice Kenny of the Irish Supreme
Court recently said, reflecting approvingly on twenty years of 'active' interpretation of
the Irish bill of rights: 'Judges have become legislators and have the advantage that
they do not have to face an opposition.'4
And my argument there concluded5 by asking whether we truly need to
"impose on our courts the task of confronting either legislation or common
The essay under discussion already made that point: "The political scientist, from a relatively external
viewpoint, will rightly identify ways in which the outcome of legislative deliberations is affected by factors the
debaters would not advance as good reasons for choosing that outcome. But he will do the same for the higher
judiciary, and for the process of choosing its members." Human Rights and Their Enforcement, in 3 Cou.ECTED
EssAYs oF JoHN FiN'Is 26 (2011) [CEJF 111 (emphasis added).
4 John Kenny, The Advantages of a Written Constitution Incorporating a Bil of Rights, 30 NILQ 189-206, 196
(1979). As J. M. KELLY, THE IRISH CoNsTIrrunON 475, n. 29 (2d ed. 1984), points out, Kenny J's "have become"
refers to the epoch inaugurated by his own judgment in Ryan v. A-G (1965) IR 294.
The paragraph reads:
Yet this was not mere usurpation. The constitutional text, by confusing education and inspiration with
government, has required or at least invited judicial excursions beyond legal learning. The exigencies of
federation virtually oblige the constitution-maker to impose extraordinary responsibilities on the courts
who must supervise the distribution of powers between co-ordinate central and local legislatures. One
must ask oneself whether some comparable exigency suggests that we should impose on our courts the
task of confronting either legislation or common law with the uncharted "necessities of a democratic
society."
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law with the uncharted 'necessities of a democratic society'." That looked back
to the argument's main formulation:
What is "necessary in a democratic society for the protection of, say, morals" is, it
seems to me, an issue not to be mastered by legal learning or lawyerly skills.6
This whole line of thought was given a potent exposition in a judgment of
my former Oxford colleague, Justice Heydon, dissenting in Australia's highest
court in Momcilovic v R (2011).7 In Heydon J's opinion, the power to "inter-
pret" the provisions of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (a
statute of the State of Victoria) is an essentially legislative, not judicial power
(and so, under the rigorous Australian doctrine of separation of judicial from
executive and legislative power, cannot be validly conferred upon a court8 ). For
the Charter sets out rights abstractly stated, and with a general provision that
they may be "subject under law to such reasonable limits as can be justified in
a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom."9
As Heydon J. found, this is a signal (or indeed statement) that the lawmakers
of the Charter intend that other, subsequent lawmakers-the courts!-will re-
solve political conflict about which among the possible moral and legal mean-
ings of "P has a right to X" will be favored in law. Such a delegation or transfer
of law-making authority imposes on the judges a task which my essay argued is
radically inappropriate for an institution purporting to apply the law.
Pace Harel, I do not think this inappropriateness is because "rights-based
constitutional decisions made by courts distort and misconstrue the nature of
the deliberation concerning fundamental rights," or because "fundamental
rights are an issue of justice rather than justice according to the law."
Rather, I think that, as Heydon J. also argues, almost all our existing law,
laid down in legislation and the gradually developed and developing common
law private and public law, exists to protect "fundamental rights" or "human
rights." The point that Heydon J. and I each go on to make is that declarations
of rights in the form of Bills or Charters of rights are abdications of the normal,
appropriate domain of legislation (and of evolving common law)lo to, in effect,
6 CEJF III: 42 (emphasis added).
[2011) HCA 34 (High Court of Australia). In the background is GatGoIRE WEBBER, THE NEoTIABLE
CoNsTirrunoN: ON TE LIMrrATION OF RIGHTS (2009), and essays in RIcHARD EGn.s (ed.), MODERN
CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW (2011).
' On the dubious origins of this doctrine in its application to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Australia, see 4 CoLLECTED EssAys OF Jo-N FINnis 12-13, 15-16 [CEJF IV]. Under the special application or
extension of the doctrine made, equally questionably, in Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions for NSW
(1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996] HCA 24, the Supreme Courts of the States must comply with the doctrine in all
their exercises of jurisdiction, because they are also invested with federal jurisdiction.
9 The formula with its accompanying non-exhaustive list of five "relevant factors" is taken from the s. 36 of
the South African Bill of Rights, Part II of the Constitution of 1997. For a review of limitation clauses since the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, see Webber, supra note 7, 60-2.
1o On the compatibility (in principle) of cautious judicial development of common law with the judicial task of
applying the law, see my Analogical Reasoning and Law, CEJF IV essay 19, and Adjudicaion and Legal Change,
CEJF IV essay 20 (originally The Fairy Tale's Moral, 115 L QuAr. REv. 354-73 (1999)).
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a superior legislator that then operates under the mask of applying law when
in reality it is making law in a way partly distorted and degraded" by the
inappropriate matrix of purported law-applying in which this law-making is
performed.
Thus the absence of "ambivalence" which Harel counts as a merit of judicial
decisions on broad abstract rights is precisely the inauthenticity that I am
complaining of. Nor is he entitled to assume, as he does, that courts simply
"identify what the pre-existing legislature's duties are" or that "courts' deci-
sions concerning basic rights are binding independently of any will (including
the will of the courts making these decisions); they are binding (and publicly
understood to be binding) by virtue of their content." The point of my essay's
and Heydon J's argument is that the indeterminacy of the provisions that are
"interpreted" in judicial human rights decisions, provisions involving as
they do-within an exceptionally wide, loose "frame" (in Kelsen's image) of
determinacy-an almost infinite rangel 2 of sheer choices amounting to a real
" In particular, the proper consideration of the issues of rights, justice and common good is liable to be
distorted by appeals to "binding precedents" and/or to legalistic arguments that some prior decision (e.g. to
permit homosexual adoption) commits the polity or the electorate or the law to a decision "consistent" with it
(e.g. to permit same-sex marriage)-whereas a voter or a legislator could more rationally decide that the later
decision should be inconsistent with the earlier as a first step to reversing the earlier, unsound decision.
12 Heydon J at [432] quotes the analysis by THomAs Pooui, The Reformation of English Administrative Law, 68
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 142, 146 (2009). Here is the context in paragraphs 428-30 and 432 of Heydon J's judgment:
[428] ... Section 7(2) gives a court power to... decide the legal extent of the limit to a human right. The
limit is then the criterion against which a particular statutory provision is measured under s 32(1) to deter-
mine whether it can be interpreted "in a way that is compatible with human rights." The limit to a human
right must be "reasonable". What is the relevant criterion of reason? What can be "justified" - and not only
justified, but "demonstrably" justified? What is the difference between that which is "justified" and that
which is "demonstrably justified"? The shrill, intensifyring adverb merely highlights the vacuity of the verb.
The next question asks what can be demonstrably justified in a "free and democratic society" - and not just
any free and democratic society, but one "based on human dignity, equality and freedom". Section 7(2) then
calls for the "taking into account [of] all relevant factors". The criteria for identifying the relevance of a
particular factor are not defined. But a non-exhaustive list of five relevant factors then appears. The first (s
7(2)(a)) is the "nature of the right" (but not its "purpose" (cf s 7(2)(b)) or its "extent" (cf s 7(2)(c)). The
second (s 7(2)(b)) is the importance "of the purpose of the limitation" - not the importance of the limitation
itself. The third (a 7(2)(c)) is the "nature and extent of the limitation". The fourth (s 7(2)(d)) is the
"relationship between the limitation and its purpose". The fifth (s 7(2)(e)) is "any less restrictive means
reasonably available to achieve the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve."
[429] The origins of s 7(2) may be illustrious. But its language is highly general, indeterminate, lofty,
aspirational and abstract. It is nebulous, turbid and cloudy....
[430] Section 7(2) depends in a number of respects on analysis by reference to "purpose" (s 7(2)(b), (d)
and (e)). Does "purpose" refer only to the purpose revealed in the language, or something wider? Section
7(2) depends in two respects on an appeal to reasonableness (the opening words of s 7(2) and s 7(2)(e)).
Although s 7(2) does not talk of "balancing", as the Explanatory Memorandum and the Second Reading
Speech did, that is the process it involves. But the things to be balanced or weighed are not readily
comparable - the nature of a right and various aspects of a limitation on it, the nature of a right and
other rights, the nature of a right and "all relevant factors", which could include many matters of practical
expediency of which courts know nothing, social interests about which it is dangerous for courts to
speculate and considerations of morality on which the opinions of the governed may sharply differ
from those of the courts. It is for legislatures to decide what is expedient in practice, what social
claims must be accepted, and what moral outcomes are to be favoured - not courts....
[432] Section 7(2) creates a kind of "proportionality" regime without comprehensible criteria. The regime
operates as a method of determining what the formulation of the law is to be - ie the precise form a
legislatively recognised human right is to take, which in turn is used as a factor relevant to determining the
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discretion guidable only by political preferences and hunches, is an indetermin-
acy so far-reaching and deep-going that it would be thoroughly mistaken to say
that the court's decision in such cases, when it is delivered, is binding by virtue
of its content or identified anybody's pre-existing duties. If the public or "the
polity" believes that such court decisions are binding by virtue only of their
content, or are simply identifications of pre-existing duties, then the public or
polity is deceiving itself. That again is my complaint about the inauthenticity of
such court decisions: that such decisions are, with utter starkness, binding by
the will of the (say) five judges who outnumber the (say) four dissenters-a
brute fact that has nothing whatever to do with propositional content-and are
decisions not identifying duties but imposing them, retroactively (of course), by
virtue of the fiction that here the judges are doing what judges ordinarily do. In
other words, Harel's descriptions of the judicial role simply assume all the very
points in dispute.13
Dyson Heydon, like myself, grew up in a country, Australia, that has had the
profound good fortune to have no judicial review of legislation on "fundamen-
tal rights" grounds, and whose citizens therefore, in Harel's view (fully ex-
pressed in his earlier draft and still insinuated now around cues 6-8), have
lived this last century and more under the shadow of the legislature's "whims"
and thus are deprived of "republican freedom." Well, that is what Australia's
citizens chose open-eyed in 1898, precisely so that they would not have to live
in the world of humiliating make-believe in which the future shape of their
common good is announced to them by judges under the often phony descrip-
tion "applying the law." After all these years their great-grandchildren and their
fellow citizens and lawfully resident non-citizens are still living as freely and
well as any people in the world (though this can no longer be said of those in
the State of Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, where new "human
rights" provisions and tribunals, as in Canada, now make sinister and oppres-
sive inroads on important rights such as freedom of political speech on vital
matters, and freedom of private association). 14 As to the rest of the world, I am
interpretation of other statutes. But it creates a type of proportionality which "is plastic and can in
principle be applied almost infinitely forcefully or infinitely cautiously, producing an area of discre-
tionary judgement that can be massively broad or incredibly narrow - and anything else be-
tween" (emphasis added).
" This is perhaps the place to mention that the reason why I said (to Harel's approval) that the claim or
objection that "judicial review is undemocratic" is an "unimpressive objection" was, in the end, that "in a North
American type of political order the free citizen's power over judicial appointments is not less than his influence
over legislation" (CEJF III at 22). I went on to suggest (23) that this might make anyone uneasy, since it treats
the judiciary as if it were a kind of legislature.
14 This does not mean that the rights of free speech, free exercise of religion and so forth enjoyed by
Australians before and after 1900 are matters, as Harel's final paragraph in this part supposes, of merely "statu-
tory right." Whatever may be the statutory provisions for and regulation of them, they are conceived by
Australians as moral, political and common-law rights (and no doubt, latterly, as human rights in the form
enjoyed by Australians)-that is as rights that pre-exist and provide the rationale for their statutory embodiments
and props (if any).
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inclined to say: of all the now hundreds of cases in which a European or British
tribunal has decided that British legislation was incompatible with European
human rights, I can think of no case in which the decision was truly called for
by human rights, properly understood, or by the European Convention on
Human Rights and Freedoms as drafted, adopted, and intended. The ongoing
humiliation of free peoples by sections of their own and other legal elites has
amongst its many bad consequences for their common good the consequence
that it tends to reduce their legislatures to the abject position, at once irrespon-
sible (as exercisers of mere "discretion") and subordinate, entailed by Harel's
(and many modern lawyers') conception of them.
II
Harel and I agree that punishment, precisely as such, can only be justly
imposed by an officer as representative of the state and not by the victim or
any other bystander.1 5 And Harel's account of my view of retribution is entirely
accurate, until he comes to apply to it a paraphrase and a label. The paraphrase
has it that retribution is for the sake of restoring harmony, and the label is
"consequentialist." True, my theory says that retribution looks forward to the
time when the balance of advantages, disturbed by the offence as an act of ill-
gotten freedom, is restored by the retributive act of subjecting the offender to a
deprivation of freedom. But that is not a consequentialist theory: the restor-
ation of balance (of fairness between the law-abiding and the offender) is
accomplished in the act (however brief or extended) of punishment, not as a
consequence of that act.16 And it has nothing to do with restoring harmony
as some empirical condition of people's attitudes to each other. Changes in
attitudes as a consequence of punishment are one of the countless kinds of
consequences of punishing or not punishing that the retributive (and defining)
purpose of punishment is not concerned to achieve (or indeed, except in
15 In the 1999 essay from which Harel quotes my statement that punishment cannot be imposed by or on
behalf of the victim as such (CEJF III essay 12 at 178), I supply the premise two pages earlier (III: 198):
In short, retribution is one element in the general function of government: to uphold the proportionate
equality of a just distribution of advantages and disadvantages, benefits and burdens, among the members
of (and sojourners within) a political community. The precise benefit or advantage whose fair distribution
it is the primary and shaping purpose of punishment to uphold is the advantage of freedom, in one's
choosing and acting, from external constraints including the constraints appropriately imposed by laws
made for the common good.
16 Of course, just as we should distinguish real change in something (say, my waking up) from "Cambridge
change" "in" something (say, my subsequent "change" from being the only person awake in our apartment-
building to being not the only person awake in the building [or: to being one of two people awake in our
building]), so too we should distinguish real consequences (such as deterrence or reform or embittering and
vengeful resolve of the offender) from "consequences" that are, rather, parts or entailments of the act (whatever
its real consequences). (To make this distinction is not to deny the relevance (in other discussions) of, for example,
the intransitive effects of choice and action (on which see Commensuration and Public Reason, in 1 CoIEcTED
EssAYs OF JoHN has 239-40 (2011) [CEJF I])
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special circumstances, to avoid). So I have not said, and never would say,
that retribution is concerned to restore harmony.
It is in my 1987 essay on just war theory that I get around to saying, briefly,
why punishment cannot be rightly imposed by or even on behalf, precisely, of
the victim qua victim, or by any private person or body qua private. That essay
was the occasion, because this long-recognized truth about retribution created
a significant difficulty for the central tradition of just-war theorizing:
... Punishment is essentially the restoration of a fair balance between the offender and the
law-abiding, a balance which the commission of an offence disturbs by enacting the
offender's willingness to take the advantage of doing as one pleases when the law
requires a common restraint; and persons who are not responsible for upholding the
balance of fairness in distribution of advantages and disadvantages in a community cannot
by "punitively" repressing wrongdoers accomplish that restoration of fairness which
their act, by purporting to be punishment, pretends to accomplish (CEJF III essay
13 at 191).
Since there is no government of the world community, this thesis entails, for just
war theory, that a state wronged by another state cannot go to war for retribu-
tive purposes, properly understood, since like all states it lacks any public au-
thority in relation to the international domain. (It can, however, resort justly to
warlike measures which many would call punitive, for example to forcibly exact
reparations for wrongfully inflicted losses.) Where a government is lawfully and
properly in place within a state, it will rightly appropriate to itself all such
measures, including exaction of civil ("private law") compensation for victims
of offences conceptualized in law as torts (or delicts).x Indeed, I hold that
(i) the only function non-substitutably reserved to state government and law
is that of adjudicating with a view to determining whether or not to impose
irreparable measures of penalty, and (ii) the only intrinsic (basic) human good
actualized by state action is the justice such action can retributively restore.' 9
17 That is not to say that consequences are irrelevant to a just decision to impose punishment:
For although fairness is a component of the overall social good, it is only a component, and it would be
silly to sacrifice important social goods simply to secure a scrupulously restored order of fairness. Indeed,
if it is unfair to law-abiding citizens not to punish criminals, it is more unfair to them to punish criminals
when it is clear that the punishment will lead to more crime, more unfairness by criminals and more
danger and disadvantage to law-abiding citizens (CEJF III essay 11 (Retribution: Punishment's Formative
Aim) at 165).
That way of phrasing the point is insufficiently precise to avoid a taint of seeming consequentialism, in which
fairness is not a duty but a value to be traded off against other values. A better way of making the same point
would say that restoring the balance of advantages and disadvantages that is necessarily disturbed by freely
chosen crime is an affirmative responsibility of the state's government and law which, like all affirmative respon-
sibilities, is subject to being overridden by countervailing moral responsibilities, such as the duty to protect the
vulnerable against injuries that might (in some peculiar circumstances) be done to them by criminals as a result
of retribution.
18 See CEJF IV: 150-2 (against conceiving the law of torts as giving effect to the impulse of victims to "get
even" with the tortfeasor).
9 JomN FiNas, AQuNAs: MoRAL, PoLmcA, AND LEGAL THEoRY 246-51 (1998).
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In short, I think there is not much to debate between us on this matter. 20
III
Schwartz's explanation and thematizing of subsidiarity is very welcome, and
repairs a deficiency in my own thinking about the bases of a sound political
theory. For when I came to a change of view to which Schwartz does not draw
attention, I failed (I now think) to attend enough to subsidiarity in explaining
and exploring my changed view-partly, no doubt, because I came to the
change of view in the context of working intensely on reconstructing
Aquinas's political theory, and Aquinas does not get very close to articulating
subsidiarity as a principle, 2 ' however implicit it may latently be in his working
assumptions.
Let me explain. Many of Schwartz's quotations are from CEJF III, essay 5,
on "Limited Government." That essay was published first in 1996, and-even
if (as I say in the Introduction on p. 10) it "has the right distinctions in place"
(which may be a bit generous to it)-it still "treats Aquinas as if his position
resembled Aristotle's paternalism, whereas in truth" (and this is a truth I dis-
covered only after writing essay 5) "that state paternalism is quite rejected, in
principle, by Aquinas." For Aquinas, as I show in considerable detail in ch. VII
of my Aquinas, holds that the coercive jurisdiction (as distinct from the aim) of
state government and law is restricted to external, inter-personal actions, that
is, to the domain that Aquinas calls "public good." In this respect, as my exe-
getical discussion of his theory concludes, his position is close to that of John
Stuart Mill in On Liberty.22 That is one important reason why some have called
Aquinas the first Whig, and why I call his political theory early liberal. And in
explaining and, as far as possible, justifying his thesis, I did not resort to sub-
sidiarity, though it has some connection to the fundamental reason I was able
to find to support the thesis about the limits of the coercive jurisdiction of state
government and law, namely that individuals and families and the sorts of civil
association that they can arrange by agreement or convention are prior to the
state, so that state government and law must justify its claims to coercive jur-
isdiction, and cannot do so simply by showing (if it could) that its coercive
measures could succeed in making people morally better in their private lives
and activities.
2o In the background are, of course, plenty of matters for debate. Harel (like Hart) holds, for example, that
what characterizes criminal sanctions is that they involve "pain or other unpleasant consequences" (inflicted on
an offender for his offence): Why Only the State may Inflict Criminal Sanctions: the Case against Privately Inflicted
Sanctions, 14 Leg. Th. 113, 116 (2008). I hold that such a definition makes retribution (properly so called)
virtually unintelligible: CEJF III essay 10 (1968) at 160, 162; essay 12 (1999) at 173, 177. And I do not consider
(as Harel seems to) that the defining aim of punishment is the manifesting of public condemnation and disap-
probation considered as a process that can be more or less "effective."21 For his nearest approach, see Finnis, supra note 19, 237 at n. 82.
22 Finnis, supra note 19 at 228.
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Beyond this, I have no reason to demur from Schwartz's helpful discussion.
I add two side notes. (1) In very recent writing, I have expressed doubts about
calling the state an instrumental association, or the political common good an
instrumental good. Instead, I express some favor for the adjective "subsidiary"
for use where I had been saying "instrumental." 23 So Schwartz's observations
were doubly welcome. (2) In these recent writings I also address the point, and
indeed the passage, that Schwartz draws to our attention from NLNR 169:
state activity should not intend "to take over the formation, direction, or man-
agement of the lower-level personal initiatives and interpersonal associations."
About this I say-
Just as, for example, the privileges of the English Parliament exclude any manage-
ment, direction, control, or takeover of either House by the courts or the executive,
yet do not entail that the criminal law and its officers have no jurisdiction over acts
and events within Parliament, so state government and law have some proper regu-
latory role in relation to even the internal affairs of families and religious associations.
The limit excludes any aim to take over their formation, direction or management.
[fn.... by 'direct(ion)' I [mean] the sort of things that the board of directors of a
corporation does - the sort of things that someone who has taken over an enterprise as
sole owner of it does in managing it.] 'Take over', like 'dignity' and 'equal protection',
is vague, but like them, is not without content, especially when embedded in a course
of argument that shows the worth of individual self-direction and marital equality in
freedom, goods clearly basic and at least as important in living a human life as
political community properly is.2 4
So Schwartz is entirely correct to note that "takeover" has nothing essentially
to do with force, and can be effective, and a wrongful (and morally void)
assumption of authority, even when welcome, invited or freely agreed to.
The comments that Schwartz has added as the final paragraphs of part 6 of
his essay raise fair questions about the matters I have briefly set out in this
response. The answers lie in the direction he indicates: there can be more than
one ground for the conception of just and good social order that includes both
the principle of subsidiarity and the restriction of state governmental jurisdic-
tion to public good and external acts. If we ask why the largely instrumental
character of state government limits or tends to limit its jurisdiction over non-
instrumental associations and the persons who are their members and the
fundamental component of the state, the answer at least in large part will
take the form of reversing the challenge. It is for the state's government and
law to prove that its jurisdiction rightly reaches so far into the lives of those
persons and associations whose good is more intrinsic than its. 25
23 Reflections and Responses in ROBERT GEORGE & JOHN KEOWN (eds), REASON, MORALITY AND LAW: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNcs 514 (2013).24 Id. at 515.
2s See Finnis, supra note 19 at 242ff.
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Harel holds that "the legal system ought to give its stamp of approval" to
sexual relationships of a kind (or kinds-he restricts his attention to same-
sex couples but not to trans-species couples or hetero- or same-sex threesomes,
foursomes, etc.) that, he grants (without conceding) "cannot fully realize the
relevant goods" of genuine marriage and inherently involve delusions of mean-
ingfulness in their sexual intimacies. Here are four reasons why such a stamp of
approval would be, and where already given is, a serious injustice and a long-
term wound-very likely to be crippling-to the common good.2 6
(1) Stamping same-sex partnerships as marital gives the state's approval to-
indeed, colludes in-the shocking injustice of deliberately bringing into exist-
ence children with a view to their each living, in every case and by design,
without knowledge of or relationship with, or the care of his or her father,
or alternatively his or her mother, or perhaps either, and being instead attended
to by a woman somehow imitating a father, or by a man somehow imitating a
mother, or else without even the pretence of having a mother, or a father (as
the case may be). I do not say that the adoption of children by homosexual
couples is intrinsically evil in the sense that it should never be considered
permissible, but it should be reserved to the last resort where the only alter-
native is abandonment or its near equivalents. But encouraging homosexual
couples to deliberately bring children into existence for the purposes of such a
defective form of parenting is unjust, and is an immediate and ineluctable
implication of everything savoring of same-sex marriage. I am not arguing
that the immorality and injustice of such generation of fatherless or motherless
children exceeds, necessarily and per se, 2 7 the immorality and injustice of casual
sex generating fatherless children (a phenomenon that in its scale and dire
consequences is characteristic of decadent late-liberal states such as ours);
but no one is out there in the public square arguing that the state should
put its stamp of approval on casual sex and illegitimacy. Nor am I discriminat-
ing against homosexual generation of unfathered or unmothered children;
I hold that it is similarly immoral and unjust, and should be a criminal offence,
26 These reasons do not apply to state recognition of domestic partnerships on a basis that in law and in
public understanding and acceptance has nothing to do with the presence or absence of sexual intimacy between
the partners and therefore neither legally nor socially imitates or gives the appearance of marriage. But, of course,
this is not the basis on which legal status (beyond mere ad hoc contracts) has been given to civil partnerships in
all (so far as I know) the states that in recent years have enacted such a status. And given the resources of the law
of contracts and trusts, I see no sufficient reason for creating a legal status-category of domestic or "civil"
partnerships. And their approximation in public perception (and in the motivation of those who have pressed
for their introduction) to marriage is strong reason not to introduce such a status.
27 But in fact there is an overwhelmingly probable consequence of being raised by a same-sex sex-partnership
("marriage"), viz. that one will have great difficulty in getting clear about the nature and good of marriage, and
so will tend to be severely obstructed in participating in that basic human good. In this respect, there is an
injustice in same-sex parenting that is absent, in most cases, from casual illegitimacy and single-parent rearing
(for all the injustice of the latter).
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to arrange for generation of children by in vitro fertilization for single men or
women, whether or not they are involved in sexual relationship with anyone.
(2) The stamp of state approval Harel supports is also, in late-liberal socie-
ties like ours, the stamp of disapproval of every kind of "discrimination
against" such pseudo-marriages and against the anti-marital view of sex that
these parodic imitations of marriage embody.28 And here we see the other face
of state "stamping": the stamping out, in the name of equality and non-
harassment, of all save secret or deeply private forms of "hetero-normativity"
or "heterosexism" or "gender stereotyping" such as is implicit in such comple-
mentarity-laden terms as "mother" and "father," "husband and wife," "mater-
nal" and "paternal,"2 "manly" and "womanly," "feminine" and "masculine,"
indeed "men" and "women." Parents who think legal same-sex marriage will
not affect their own marriage will learn otherwise when their children come
home from school aged five or six having been subjected to the first stages of a
decade-long program of social conditioning and state stamping designed to
"gender mainstream" them, that is, to impose on them the ideology according
to which there is no naturally or intrinsically reasonable and normative sex/
gender distinction (as between male and female) or sex role (as in father and
mother, husband and wife) but instead an ever more finely variegated spectrum
of so-called gender identities, to be "discerned" or rather adopted after agonies
of pseudo-discernment and choice: lesbian, gay, straight, bi-sexual, trans-
gender, intersex, queer, questioning, and so on all the way, in due course, to
sexual orientations such as to paedophilia and incest perhaps, and certainly to
bestiality in line with Harel's paradigmatically late-liberal dictum "I do not see
why the orifices used for sexual gratification matter." (Objection: Harel said
nothing about anti-discrimination coercion of those who object to the flaunting
of homosexual activity. Response: The stamp of state approval that he supports
is inherently coercive; in all our polities all homosexual couples are free right
now to stage a wedding with all their friends, negotiate whatever recognition
they like with employers, make contracts and wills entitling them to whatever
mutual rights and privileges they please; what they lack, in the absence of state
approval, is the right to coerce other persons and their associations to approve
and collaborate.) Anyway, the bad effects on children of this deeply erroneous,
25 Simon Hope, at cue 21 in his essay, says that the success of political demands for legal recognition of
homosexual marriage "coincides neatly with" the thesis that marriage is a basic good (a good that everyone has
reason to pursue). Not so. The successful purloining or misappropriation of the term "marriage" by same-sex
couples and the homosexual cultural-political movement has no greater capacity to make such couplings instan-
tiations of the good of marriage than the (mis)appropriation of the term by polygamists or by Shia practitioners
of nikhar mut'ah (a.k.a. prostitution).
29 Already, at the very dawn of the unfolding bad times, we see Hope saying that there is "no reason why
gendered identities of 'mother' and 'father' are needed" for meeting children's needs, and that anyone who thinks
otherwise is "guilty of an arbitrarily narrowed focus." Such high-handedness about the millennially experienced
judgment of our own and many other civilizations, to be set aside after a couple of decades' breezy Zeitgeist,
bodes very ill for our societies and first of all for their children.
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coercively imposed3 0 politico-ethical ideology will be profound and in many
cases prompt-increases in suicide, anomie, listlessness and loneliness, and
then, later, more failed marriages, divorces and damaged children, as the
true complementarity of the two real sexes is constantly downgraded if not
derided and defied.
(3) Meanwhile, the same children will get the message: official parity of
esteem-that is, their parents' marital acts, and their own if they choose mar-
riage, are no more expressive of a chaste and wholesome, honorable commitment
to a lifelong friendship open to procreation and the upbringing of good sons
and daughters than sodomy is. ("What does it matter what orifices are used for
sexual gratification?") This ongoing devaluation and hollowing-out of marriage
will be the ongoing inbuilt consequence of officially calling homosexual cou-
pling marriage and marital. For the very first time, the state and its law will be
ratifying and commending and holding out as good a form of sexual relationship and
activity that is inherently anti-marital (and therefore immoral).
Fornication (sex by the unmarried), masturbation, adultery (including con-
sensual adultery), polygamous sex, are all bad sex because one's approving
them (for oneself or anyone) is necessarily incompatible with one's engaging
in, or coherently approving, non-corrupt forms of marital sex between husband
and wife. None of these are now given the stamp of the state's approval. Why
are all these, like same-sex or inter-species sex acts, immoral, in ways that
ought to be of concern to the citizens and government of states even though
the truly private consensual immoral acts of adults should not as such be
treated as criminal offences? The core argument can be summarized thus:
approval of any of the many kinds of non-marital sex act - including the sex acts of
"married" same-sex couples - entails a kind of conditional willingness to engage in
sexual activity in a way that is in truth non-marital, that is, in a way that does not
allow the parties to the act to thereby actualise, express and experience their marriage
as a committed, permanent, exclusive friendship open to procreation. And such will-
ingness, while it endures, is incompatible with genuinely marital acts, and thus
wounds the marriage of those couples one or both of whom has such a willingness,
however remote and conditional.
In other words, maintaining the integrity, meaningfulness and stability of mar-
riage-as an institution vital to society and to justice for children, and as a
personal and inter-personal act that should last a lifetime32 and is very
3o I refer to the relevant laws' execution, child by child and parent by parent, not to the laws' enactment/
introduction, which will in some cases have been democratic and have had the relevant parents' (all too often
mistaken) assent.
" For much fuller articulation and defense of this line of thought, see CEJF III essays 20, 21 (especially the
last section) and 22, and CEJF IV: 135-8.
" On a marriage as an act, see CEJF III: 317; the thought is not to be confused with the notion of marital
acts, sex acts of the kind that express, actualize and enable the spouses to experience their marriage. The act of
committing to and living out a marriage has at its centre the agreement to engage together, with full mutuality, in
such acts: Id. at 319.
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demanding-requires that anyone who (whether from inside or outside) values
that institution must disapprove any choice to obtain sexual satisfaction by a
sex act outside proper marriage or in a non-marital way inside marriage.
(4) So sex ethics matters to political philosophy because such a wound is not
only an injustice to the other spouse, and to the children impaired by conse-
quently limping or failed marriages and to those later injured by those children.
It also is contrary to the political common good in the additional and funda-
mental respect that it makes vanishingly unlikely the sustainability, long- or
even medium-term, of the societies, the peoples, that have wounded their
institution of marriage by encouraging and endorsing such false and harmful
ideas. The wounding of marriage so as to bring it into line with the contra-
ceptive, abortifacient, feminist, and other marriage-dissolving demands and
practices of many heterosexuals has already put all our peoples on an ever-
steepening path to wreckage if not extinction.
To Hope it seems that my arguments are merely expressions of "a particular
social morality in the Christian tradition" which, he suspects, is traceable to
"the remarkable attempts in early Christian thought at making sexuality rather
than death the centre of human frailty." But this is just a mistake. If one wishes
to look at Christian thought, one can find the entire substance of the concept
of marriage (the concept that I am defending with philosophical consider-
ations) in the relevant verses, few but decisive,33 of Gospels that are definitive
for the Christian tradition and entirely free from any attempt to "make sexu-
ality rather than death the centre of human frailty." And in pointing to
Christianity, Hope fails to take real account of the texts I have cited to
show3 4 that both the ethics I defend and the judgment that it matters to pol-
itical theory are in essentials taught by the best philosophers and reporters of
philosophical argument who none of them knew anything of Christianity:
Plato, Aristotle, Musonius Rufus, and Plutarch, along with the Kant who,
like the Hegel I did not cite but could and should have, considered himself a
" Matthew 19: 4-6; Mark 10: 5-9.
34 See CEJF III: 100, 338-40.
3s Hope, n. 24, says that Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch and Musonius Rufus are enemies, rather than friends, of
the sex ethics I defend, because
their views are fundamentally shaped by outlooks in which women are necessarily both socially and
naturally, inferior to men, and in which upright behaviour between the sexes reflects this fact. The
mutual respect of Finnis's account is nowhere to be found in such outlooks. For the Roman writers, see Part
I of Peter Brown, The Body and Society (Columbia University Press, 1988)... (emphasis added)
But though Peter Brown says nothing false about Musonius Rufus (and at 23 and 91 gives some evidence to
contradict Hope's claim about the latter), it is as much a mistake to rely on his book for an account of what
Musonius thinks as it is to rely on his best-selling Augustine of Hippo for a philosophically or theologically helpful
account of Augustine's ideas and arguments. Brown, with supreme skill, pursues a deconstructive agenda firmly
tied to late-twentieth century, late-liberal tropes; for all his learning, he actually muffles or silences the arguments
of the thinkers he divertingly cinematises. Any reader of the passages of Musonius and Plutarch I cite can see that
"the mutual respect of Finnis's account" is finely articulated by those Roman thinkers. The pages cited by Hope
from Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity get nowhere near the texts I have cited (or even the issues in
dispute) and constantly divert, like Hope's footnote 24, onto the question of women's place in political society.
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philosopher big enough to make his own entirely free judgments about matters
on which Christianity has a teaching. They all hold, in substance, that sex is for
marriage and marriage, being about not only friendship but also and definingly
the procreation and nurture of children, is of fundamental importance for the
sustainability and justice of a society. They are right, and late-liberal political
theory, in its silent trashing of sex ethics, is the mere apologetical mirror of
decadent societies that, having done a vast deal of injustice to children along
the way, will also, before very long I believe, be-at least in many cases-the
late late-liberal polities, whose colonisers will dominate them with little interest
in either the theory or the practices of liberalism, whether late, unjust and
unreasonable or early and (in these matters) just and reasonable.
That is the most abrupt version of the conclusions from a line of enquiry
pursued in the essays I have mentioned on sex and marriage, where you will
find more of the necessary premises than I have offered here.
V
Hope's main argument is an interesting, sophisticated form of moral relativism
(with a last-minute, scarcely integrated escape clause). At its root-or, at any
rate, at the root of the argument Hope here develops-is a notion that "prac-
tical reason is to set standards for a plurality of agents." Call that his basic
premise. In this premise the Kantian notion of practical reason as one's giving
(moral) law for oneself is extended or taken by Hope to entail that practical
reason is also a matter of giving law (setting moral standards) for, and with the
assent of, many or all persons. Hope "do[es] not think that Finnis... would
dispute the schematic claim" that, by reason of that basic premise, moral
standards "must be vindicated by reasons that all can find accessible": his
emphasizing of the "can" seems (though I'm not sure) to denote some sort
of hic et nunc disposition of addressees to agree to a proferred reason as com-
patible with their existing beliefs. From there Hope's argument proceeds
smoothly: the practical and moral reflections of all (or at least very many) of
us are shaped by "constellations of thick ethical concepts and categories";
therefore, any consideration claimed to be a moral reason needs-since by
virtue of the basic premise it must be accessible to the possessors of such
thick concepts and categories-to "establish a connection" with all those con-
stellations of thick concepts and categories, or at least with all the constella-
tions possessed/borne by someone actually "addressed by" a moral claim. In
the absence of such a "connection," the practical or specifically moral reason-
ing "addressed to" addressees "will appear arbitrary" and "becomes at best
mere bluff and bluster and at worst takes on a high-handed tone." (What could
be worse?) The required "connection" is just that the reason advanced is "not
silenced," that is, that "it is deemed by the bearer of a different social morality
to be morally relevant."
161
162 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies
Like, I believe, the whole mainstream philosophical tradition at least down to
Kant, if not Kant himself, I accept neither the basic premise, nor any of the
conclusions Hope draws from it. There is no reason to assume that every
culture accepts or understands the categories "social morality" or "morally
relevant." More important, there is no reason to sieve out of one's moral opin-
ions all those that, taken as they stand, are or would be "silenced" in the
minds, as they stand, of some persons or culture somewhere to whom they
might (why?) be addressed. Moral thought is nothing like legislating, either for
oneself or, still less, for others. (In that respect it is not "lawlike.")
Commitment to practical reason and moral thought is not a "commitment to
justification" to other people as they stand. Indeed, it has nothing, essentially,
to do with "addressing" others.36 It is not a device for winning their cooper-
ation.3 It conscientiously seeks the truth about the human goods that are at
once (1) the constituents of human flourishing in oneself and other human
persons, and (2) the foundations for one's reasoning about one's responsibil-
ities to oneself and to others (whether or not those others happen to realize
that these are their entitlements). It proceeds on the basis that, if true, any
proposition about the good(s) and the right will be accessible to anyone (every-
one) under ideal epistemic conditions.3 8 So moral thought is (so to speak)
36 See CEJF I: 52 for a comment on Habermas's slide from noticing a "monological" aspect in Dworkin's
thought to accusing Dworkin of "solipsism."
" Hope cites CEJF III: 318 when stating that "For Finnis... one cannot grasp [the] goodness [of basic
human goods] without accepting that they are good for all human beings, and one depends on cooperation with
others in order to attain them." While there is some truth in the proposition I have here italicized, it is not among
the propositions at III: 318, where the passage quoted in the next footnote concludes by referring, not to one's
need for cooperation with others at large, but to one's dependence upon one's parents to sustain one until one can
contribute to their own or others' wellbeing.
38 Thus III essay 20 ("Marriage: a Basic and Exigent Good") at 318:
Moral thinking, in its central critical-practical form, begins with an understanding of the desirability and
worth of such basic human goods as life and health, knowledge, friendship, marriage, and so forth, and
terminates in judgments about what kinds of act it is not unreasonable to choose. The understanding of
basic forms of human opportunity parallels the findings of empirical sociology about the basic aspects of
human social existence, but does not depend upon or, typically, begin from such findings. [fn. See CEJF
IV essay 1 at nn. 2-12.] The eventual moral judgments are exercises of the judging person's conscience,
framed in the first person singular - about what I ought to be respecting and realizing in what I chose and
do - not exercises in praising or blaming the conduct or worthiness of other persons or societies. Yet, since
they aspire to be rational and, indeed, reasonable, they cannot fail to be exercises of public reason in its
most fundamental sense. That is, they aspire to be judgments such as anyone else could and should make, and
free from the dispositional and other sources of error which render judgment "subjective". They aspire to be
correct, objective judgments, judgments in which, under ideal epistemic conditions, everyone would
concur [fn. See Fundamentals of Ethics 62-6.].
Moreover, basic human goods are not intelligible in an essentially individualistic way. They are understood
as aspects of human wellbeing that are good not only for me but for anyone "like me" - a qualifier than
turns out to include any human person. They are good as realized in the life of a stranger in the same way,
in principle, as in my life. Moreover, my own participation in these goods is radically dependent upon the
various other persons by whose actions and forbearances I came into being and have begun and con-
tinued, more or less, to flourish and be able, for my own part, to contribute to their or others' wellbeing
(emphasis added).
Response to Harel, Hope, and Schwartz 163
epistemologically untroubled3 9 by the knowledge that, in the non-ideal epi-
stemic conditions prevailing, there are many people and cultures such that
nothing short of thoroughgoing cultural transformation would render a given,
particular moral opinion acceptable (or perhaps even intelligible) to an ad-
dressee or class of addressees. Knowledge of that fact is of course of great
practical importance, given that many goods may depend for their realization
on cooperation or at least abstention from violent opposition. But neither that
nor the consequent need for pragmatic (I do not say morally unregulated!)
modes of persuasion and dissuasion has any bearing on the warrant for the
foundational truths of practical reason.
Hope's report that "the anthropological evidence is compelling that there
exists no substantive core of moral values shared across all social moralities" 40
is entirely compatible with my report, in Natural Law and Natural Rights, that
the anthropological evidence is compelling that, in a pre-morally thin sense of
"value" and "practical principle," there are some values (basic human goods)
and practical principles more or less self-evident to all adults of more or less
normal experience and intelligence, anywhere and anytime. 4 1 Fundamental to
the account of practical reason developed in that book and all my subsequent
writings is the thesis that the first practical principles, identifying and directing
us to basic human goods, are not moral principles, and that the basic human
goods are thin enough to lend point to and make intelligible even morally evil
actions. These principles and the goods they direct to are foundations for moral
principles, and only acquire specificity and moral force (and in both those
respects "thickness") 4 2 by way of an engagement of practical reason 4 3 -with
the implications of (a) their multiplicity, (b) the multiplicity of persons in
whom they can be realized, and (c) their open-endedness in contrast with
the finitude of each acting person's lifetime, capacities and opportunities.
39 This is by no means to say that one need not acquaint oneself with the moral beliefs and culture of others,
and is entitled to be complacent about one's moral beliefs, or unwilling to debate about or reconsider them. See
the sentence I have emphasized in the passage just quoted from CEJF III: 318, and the whole of CEJF I essay 2
on the significance of discourse, a significance compatible with the truth that there is at the heart of any
worthwhile dialogue a "monologue": I: 52.
Another aspect of the matter: as Hope remarks in n. 30, "there is no practical point in reasoning with those
who would respond to reasoning with either silence or violence" or, one might add, with mere ridicule or
sophistry, or with legal repression of "offensive" speech.
40 My way of making the same point in JoHN Finus, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGirrs 84 (1980, 2011)
[NLNRI, was:
Certainly, there seems to be no practical principle which has the specificity we expect of a 'moral rule' and
which is accepted, even 'in principle' or 'in theory', amongst all human beings.
41 The listing of these takes up a long paragraph on NLNR 83.
42 But, though thin, the basic human goods in their "pre-moral" abstractness still satisfy Hope's criterion of
thickness: that in them "the evaluative and descriptive elements are inextricably intertwined so that to identify
with the concept just is to see certain reasons for action".
4 This is one's reason in pursuit of that one among the basic human goods which consists in being not just
intelligent but practically reasonable. It is the bonum rationis (which when attained is prudentia) so central to
Aquinas' ethical theory and so neglected by neo-scholastic simplifiers. Kant tried to do his own ethics with
just this good, to the neglect of all the other basic, intelligible human goods.
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This engagement with practical reasonableness 44 results not only in moral
principles and norms (rules) but also in an understanding of each of the
basic human goods in a more specified and thicker form-a specification and
deepening (via elaboration of practical reasonableness's principles and criteria
of sound judgment) which cannot at all be captured with the binary contrast
between type and token.45
True enough, the specification (making-more-specific) of basic forms of
human flourishing in more and more specific, thicker, conceptions of flourish-
ing and of justice, and corresponding forms of life, proceeds through the matri-
ces of particular cultures, traditions and social moralities. But these are all,
always, open-in principle-to critical reflection and reform at least in the
mind and judgment of intelligent and spiritually alert individuals or groups
(who may be more, or less, "prophetic", whether "philosophically" or other-
wise). None of the social moralities is rationally entitled to the blocking or
silencing role attributed to - surprisingly - each and all of them by Hope. 46
We can study the process of reformative respecification across the history of,
for example, marriage as it takes on a more fittingly thick, accurately specified
central-case form which, on grounds of the kind I pointed towards in the
preceding section-in which justice to children is central 4 7-includes the struc-
turing norms/criteria of fidelity, commitment, exclusiveness, and openness to
procreation, and excludes incest, polygamy and polygyny, and late-liberal serial
polygyny/polygamy, as well as harmful parodies such as same-sex couplings,
marriage of man (or woman) with child, sheep or dog, and so forth. The
capacity of reformers to point to basic human goods in a configuration/speci-
fication better adapted to their multiplicity and the conditions of human ex-
istence, and by so pointing to initiate and carry through reform and a measure
of intellectual conversion, is a capacity that depends upon and vindicates the
accessibility of the basic human goods to everyone, in the only sense of
"accessible to all" that "we need."48 Whether or not their "tone" might be
44 Since "practical reasonableness" is my translation of Aquinas' prudentia and Aristotle's phronesis, see my
"Prudence about Ends" (in debate with Terence Irwin) in CEJF I, essay 11.
4s Still, even with its inappropriate conceptual apparatus of type and token, Hope's attempt to show that the
basic goods are too abstract to give any accessible guidance seems to me unsuccessful. Pace Hope on Nussbaum:
to "see the value in" worshipping a particular deity in a particular way is also to understand how others could see
value in worshipping another deity in another way, an understanding not blocked by one's judgment that their
conception of deity and of fitting worship is riddled with metaphysical falsehood and repellent moral perversions.
Hope, here as elsewhere, seems to me to be overlooking the fact that practical reasoning towards judgment about
the choiceworthy always has both evaluative and factual premises-at least one of each type.
'6 The limits to such silencing tentatively indicated at cue 32 of Hope's essay do not detract from the uni-
versality with which he seems to attribute to each and every social morality the power to silence sound moral
judfnent-the universality, that is to say, of his moral relativism.
It is central in Aquinas' sex ethics, which also looks to justice to (equality with) women as the biologically
more vulnerable (in many ways) of sex couples: see Summa conra Gentiles III cc. 122-5.
48 So I deny both limbs of Hope's dilemma: "Finnis either downplays the diversity and contingency of social
moralities, or he builds into the conditions for accessibility an identification with one substantive, thick under-
standing of the human good." Again: I deny that "actualization [of capacities for reasoning] is always a process of
habituation into a particular social morality, the deliverances of which are historically contingent." Sometimes the
actualization of practical reason's capacities is by way of exiting from a particular social morality into a genuinely
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judged "high-handed" by conservatives, such reformers do not accomplish
authentic reforms by bluff and bluster.
At the last moment, so to speak, Hope sees a crack in the door of the prison
of his social moralities-sees the outline of some considerations that are not to
be silenced. I agree with him that the idea of "basic needs and vulnerabilities"
is indeed relevant and liberating, though "finitude" seems to me too negative,
passive, late-liberal a master-category. But what are these needs? Hunger, pace
Hope in fn 32, is not a need in the relevant sense; the need thereabouts is
nourishment in the sense of being nourished, that is, sufficiently well-fed to be
fit-alive and well-for choice and action. Other needs include having children
to carry on the race, and understanding the world and our place in it, while
other vulnerabilities include-but it is obvious how the story carries on: we are
rejoining the list of basic human goods that I found articulated in masterworks of
the philosophical tradition and have ventured to explore, develop, and defend
as what practical reason's first principles direct us to, and as the source, when
specified, of moral criteria for reforming any social morality.
For reasonableness in specification of the basic human goods quickly in-
volves the thickness of morally responsible conceptions such as (to put another,
different example alongside that of marriage) the specification of sociability to
political association and society, with its structuring norms of legislative justice,
citizens' allegiance, authority, Rule of Law, and so forth. (The relevant tokens
are then "our marriage," "my polity," and so forth, each being measured in
conscience for its moral correspondence to the rationally appropriate specifica-
tion of the basic human good at stake.)
In sum: this process is not fundamentally a matter of "addressing" others, as
lawgivers do, but of reasoning quietly in a heart one tries to keep honest.
Conversion from social moralities is possible-intellectual conversion, which may
or may not be also religious. Philosophy itself is worthless unless such conver-
sion from the inferior to the superior is possible. (Some purported reforms are
not authentic improvements, but forms of decadence.) Plato's and Aristotle's
sex ethics represent a kind of (not fully complete) conversion from the corrupt
social morality of the elites of their day (a morality which itself had decadently
reformed a traditional morality so far forth its superior). Plato's great reflection
on philosophical conversion as such is the Myth of the Cave, but "conversion"
means no more than a fresh understanding of possibilities and relationships one
had not adequately understood, together with willingness to follow these new
insights to the conscientious judgments and choices to which they guide one.
In a good and well-formed conscience, even the framework modals of social
moralities (say "is obligatory") are given a new, purified, fully internal
new, reformed morality which, while no doubt in some senses historically contingent, is superior to the social
morality it reformed or replaced.
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understanding or interpretation or meaningfulness as requirements both of
truth-especially the truth (fertile in potential for specifications) that the
basic forms of good are common goods because each is good for you as well
as for me-and of love of neighbor as oneself.4 9
4g Leviticus 19: 18; cf. Matthew 22: 39 (= Mark 12: 31); Romnans 13: 9.
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